Révolution « culturelle »
dans le Hunan :
la gauche prolétarienne écrasée
par le pouvoir maoïste !
Deux documents intéressants retrouvés dans le cadre des polémiques récentes sur la nature de classe du prétendu « socialisme à la chinoise »…
En PDF, « Wither China ? » qui constitue en quelque sorte le manifeste de l’alliance des organisations de Gardes Rouges rebelles révolutionnaires dans le Hunan, dominante dans cette région, qui est celle d’origine de Mao lui-même, mais qui, de fait, a connu un rayonnement important dans toute la Chine, avant d’être totalement écrasée par le pouvoir maoïste, au terme d’une brève mais très violente guerre civile locale.
Pour comprendre le contexte historique de cet aspect volontairement « méconnu » par la gauche française, incapable de se sevrer de son passé maoïste, sous une forme ou sous une autre, nous publions également directement un extrait important d’une étude générale sur la GRCP, dans le passage précisément consacré aux circonstances de l’écrasement de ce mouvement Shengwulian.
Bien évidemment, la gauche prolétarienne dans le Hunan a commis des erreurs rédhibitoires qui l’ont conduit à la défaite, mais néanmoins elle avait commencé à discerner clairement la nature de classe bourgeoise bureaucratique du nouveau pouvoir en train de se mettre en place sous la forme maoïste des « Comités Révolutionnaires de triple alliance », une nature de classe capitaliste qui n’était pas fondamentalement différente de la nature de classe de la bureaucratie réactionnaire de Liu Shaoqi, qualifié de « Khrouchtchev chinois » par les dirigeants maoïstes.
La principale erreur, à court terme, mais la plus compréhensible, dans le contexte de l’époque, c’est de ne s’être pas libéré à temps de la ferveur quasi-religieuse envers le leadership « révolutionnaire » de Mao Zedong, habile manipulateur des « Gardes Rouges » durant les premiers mois de la GRCP, et habile manipulateur des forces de répression et du double langage, par la suite, pour circonvenir les mouvements de masses, une fois ses comptes réglés avec la faction de Liu Shaoqi.
Mais l’erreur la plus fondamentale de Shengwulian, assez bien cernée dans cette étude, actuellement une des mieux documentée sur le sujet, c’est de n’avoir pas su construire une réelle alternative programmatique, en termes de perspective économique et sociale, en terme de transformation des infrastructures, et pas seulement des superstructures.
Cela participe évidemment également de la croyance en l’effet « révolutionnaire socialiste » de la prise de pouvoir par le parti maoïste sur la société chinoise en 1949. Alors que l’institution et le développement même du « Capitalisme d’Etat » étaient clairement inscrits dans le programme maoïste de « Démocratie nouvelle » et encore renouvelé, en Juin 1967, par la republication du texte de Mao, « De la juste solution des contradictions au sein du peuple », contenant explicitement un appel, et donc renouvelé en pleine GRCP, à la collaboration de classe avec les capitalistes !
Il y a donc bien une leçon, encore urgente aujourd’hui, sinon plus que jamais, à tirer de cette expérience tragique : la primauté de la base, des infrastructures, sur les superstructures. C’est un rappel plus que jamais nécessaire que le retour aux fondamentaux du ML n’est pas une affaire de prétendu « dogmatisme », mais bien la nécessité, pour le prolétariat, de se réapproprier l’outil théorique qui est le sien afin de construire enfin une alternative sur la base du réel actuel, et non sur des chimères idéologiques héritées des multiples strates de la dégénérescence révisionniste de la « gauche » depuis des décennies, et notamment, depuis les contre-révolutions khrouchtcheviennes, en URSS, et maoïste, en Chine, derrière la phraséologie ronflante et illusoire de la GRCP.
En éliminant la fraction effectivement réactionnaire de Liu Shaoqi, Mao Zedong a néanmoins passé un compromis, ipso facto, avec celle, non moins réactionnaire, de Deng Xiaoping, et amorcé la mutation du capitalisme national bureaucratique chinois vers une forme comprador et collaborationniste avec l’impérialisme. Ce qui prendra concrètement forme dès sa célèbre poignée de main avec Nixon et l’afflux des dollars via la bourse de Hong Kong, en 1972.
The brunt of the criticism developed in “Whither China?” was aimed at the revolutionary committees that were being installed in Hunan and across the country as new organs of local political authority. In Yang’s view, [NDTML>>>Yang Xiguang, un des principaux activistes du mouvement Shengwulian, alliance des Gardes Rouges rebelles révolutionnaires du Hunan], the revolutionary committee was a product of political compromise, if not a sheer retreat. He speculated that in endorsing the revolutionary committee, Mao perhaps was attempting to circumvent the opposition and preserve the revolutionary forces so that “the splendid name of ‘commune’ would not be tarnished by faulty practice.” Yang offered an apology, and perhaps at the same time a veiled criticism, of Mao’s retreat: “Comrade Mao Zedong once again made a broad retreat after September, in disregard of the wishes of those eager for unrealistic victories, so as to consolidate the achievements already gained and calm the bourgeoisie in order to prevent them from taking reckless measures. A political structure for seizure of power by the bourgeoisie— the revolutionary committee or preparatory revolutionary committee— has been established. . . . The extent of this retreat was unprecedented.”
For Yang, the revolutionary committee created a regime dominated by PLA officers and civilian bureaucrats. Because the old power holders continued to hold key positions in the new power structure, the bureaucratic ruling class or “red bourgeoisie” would regain its power. The so- called power seizures and the revolutionary committees were therefore an inherently limited solution to the current political impasse. They were, in Yang’s words, “a product of the ‘revolution of dismissing officials’ . . . that did not resolve the acute antagonism between the new bourgeoisie and the people.” “The revolution of dismissing officials is only bourgeois reformism that, in a zigzag fash-ion, changes the new bureaucratic bourgeois rule prior to the Cultural Revolution into another type of bourgeois rule by bourgeois bureaucrats and a few token mass representatives.”
The so-called power seizures, according to a text titled “A Manifesto on the Current Situation” and later attributed to Yang Xiguang, “were merely the substitution of a new dynasty for the old [gaichao huandai] that either made merely cosmetic changes or simply changed nothing. . . . What were changed were merely minor aspects of the old order, not its substance.” Expressing dissatisfaction with the direction of the Cultural Revolution, “Whither China?” criticized the “doctrine of two revolutions” (erci gem-ing lun), a widely held notion among many rebels that because the first cultural revolution was winding down, achieving major politi cal changes would have to await some future occasion. “People’s minds are greatly confused. Almost unanimously they say: ‘The first cultural revolution can do only so much. There is nothing we can do except wait for the second revolution.’ ” To the contrary, Yang argued that the tasks to be accomplished as the end of the movement must be determined by the basic antagonisms that had given rise to the Cultural Revolution in the first place: “the social contradictions between the masses and the new bureaucratic bourgeoisie.” “This means overthrow of the new bureaucratic bourgeoisie, complete redistribution of power and property, and the establishment of a new society— the ‘People’s Commune of China.’ ” Until these goals were accomplished, Yang concluded, “the Cultural Revolution cannot be brought to an end.”
In his call to carry out the Cultural Revolution to the end, Yang placed great hope in the political agency of the marginalized elements in Chinese society. In an essay titled “Report of an Investigation of the Rusticated Youth Movement in Changsha,” completed in late 1967 and apparently modeled on Mao’s essay on the Hunan peasant movement, Yang claimed that the rusticated youth “formed a massive revolutionary force that caused all of society to tremble before it.” Praising the rusticates’ rebellion against the hukou system and their desire to dismantle the rustication system, Yang argued that the rusticates’ protest movement “most clearly reveals the arousal of the sharpest social questions of the Cultural Revolution and most truly illustrates its theoretical nature.” Yang claimed that the rusticates’ mobilization represented a widening of the Cultural Revolution, indicating that the movement “is moving from the upper and middle strata of society toward the lower levels, and from the cities to the villages.” For the first time, he wrote, “the rusticated youth movement has brought onto the political stage the peasants’ fierce demands for change. The rusticated youth have moved from the cities to the villages, trapped in the acute contradictions of the three great differences. They have witnessed the extreme manifestations of inequality: the city exploiting the countryside, mental labor exploiting manual labor, and excessive price disparities between industrial and agricultural products. . . . In calling for changes to be brought about amid the Cultural Revolution, their burgeoning movement has reflected this fierce demand and portends a storm of peasant revolution.” Yang also urged the rusticates to carry out extensive social investigations to discover the “real causes” of their hardships. Like Yu Luoke, discussed in Chapter 3, who criticized the bloodline theory on behalf of the black youth who were discriminated against, Yang linked the rusticates’ apparently particular or particularistic grievances to a broader political critique, arguing that the rusticates’ struggles formed an integral part of transforming Chinese society and polity through removing the bureaucratic ruling class from power:
A new capitalist class has been formed in Chinese society: a privileged stratum. The form of China’s existent political power is essentially that of a bureaucratic structure; the privileged stratum that controls this structure is a mountain weighing on the Chinese people. By having the cities exploit the villages, they fill their wallets; their high salaries are the blood and sweat of the workers, peasants, and rusticated youth. The contradiction between the great mass of laboring people and this privileged stratum is becoming increasingly acute. . . . The rusticated youth are pressed by the privileged stratum to the lowest levels of society; they are its cheap labor force. All year long they cannot provide for themselves; they have neither a tile over their heads nor a speck of dirt under their feet. It is not that they are unwilling to work hard, so why is it they cannot provide for themselves? It is because the privileged stratum employs every ingenious method to exhaust their blood and sweat.Therefore, Yang argued, “the rusticated youth must overturn the great mountain pressing atop their heads— the privileged stratum’s bureaucratic organization. This is in fact the real cause and immediate goal of the Cultural Revolution.”
Among Shengwulian activists and sympathizers, Yang Xiguang was not the only one who produced dangerous political ideas. Similar analyses were articulated by several college students, such as Zhou Guohui and Zhang Yugang, who played active roles in Hunan’s mass politics. Zhou, a sophomore who led the University Storm and Thunder, a student group active in the Xiang River coalition, authored several widely circulated speeches in which he harshly criticized revolutionary committees for being “dominated by the capitalist power holders.” Zhang, an engineering student, drew up in late 1967 an essay titled “Our Program,” in which he argued that “although China’s economic infrastructure is still generally socialist, its entire vast superstructure has largely become capitalist.” [NDTML >>> il n’y a pas de nouvelle superstructure qui puisse se développer sans une évolution équivalente dans les infrastructures, dans la base économique : https://tribunemlreypa.wordpress.com/2019/07/08/de-mao-a-xi-deux-visages-et-deux-formes-du-capitalisme-detat-en-chine/ ] As a result, “this social revolution— the Cultural Revolution— is in substance the real beginning of the socialist revolution,” a statement that in effect called into question the socialist character of the Chinese state. Zhang claimed that the goal of the Cultural Revolution was to “overthrow the newly born corrupted bourgeois privileged stratum” and to “smash the old state apparatus that serves bourgeois privilege.”
Zhang contended that despite the mass movement unleashed by the Cultural Revolution, “many still have a very poor understanding of its objectives, and their revolts against the privileged stratum have been limited to changing the immediate circumstances in which they suffer repression . . . but have barely touched on the social-class origins of the reactionary line, as well as the bureaucratic institutions that serve it.” Therefore, “the seizure of power was regarded mostly as the dismissal of individual officials from their offices, and not as the overthrow of the privileged stratum and the smashing of the old state machine.” Asserting that “the political power is still in the hands of the bureaucrats, and the seizure of power is a change in appearance only whose nature is reformist,” Zhang declared that the Cultural Revolution “only begins from the present moment. . . . The movement in the whole is still in its rudimentary stage. Its historical mission is far from fulfilled. The long march of ten thousand li has made only its very first step.”
Mao had indeed stressed the corruptibility of cadres and their progeny, who he believed might evolve into a new privileged stratum or ruling class. But Mao insisted on differentiating the majority of good cadres from the bad ones. For the young Hunanese critics, this formula was far from satisfactory. In their view, what was at issue was neither the hidden landlords or capitalists conspiring against the revolution nor the cadres degenerating into the enemy of the revolution. The main challenge facing the Cultural Revolution was decidedly not purging individual bureaucrats but rather the removal of the new ruling class produced by the very social formation spawned by the revolution. The Maoist doctrine of the Cultural Revolution was therefore limited in both social analysis and political vision. “Whither China?” argued that the Cultural Revolution should not be a movement of using “some bureaucrats to attack other bureaucrats,” in however violent fashion, but rather a social revolution in which “one class overthrows another.” [souligné par nous-TML] “This is the fi rst time the revolutionary people have tried to overthrow their powerful enemies,” wrote Yang. “[But] how shallow their knowledge of this revolution was! Not only did they fail to consciously understand the necessity to completely smash the old state machinery and to overhaul the social system, they also did not even recognize the fact that their enemy formed a class. The revolutionary ranks were dominated by ideas of ‘revolution to dismiss officials’ [baguan gemin] and ‘revolution to drag out people’ [jiuren gemin]. . . . Therefore, in the final analysis, the fruit of the revolution was taken away by the capitalist class.” The political awakening of the masses, for Yang, found its ex-pression in the new ideas emerging from the mass movement: “ ‘The new trends of thought,’ reviled by the enemies as the ‘ultraleft trends of thought’ (i.e., ‘overthrowing the new bureaucratic bourgeoisie,’ ‘abolishing bureaucratic organs,’ ‘thoroughly smashing the state machinery’), roam among the revolutionary people like a ‘specter.’
The ideological weapon of the revolutionary people in winning victory in the great proletarian socialist revolution has begun to appear in a new form.” Intriguingly, the dynamic term “trends of thought” (sichao) was contrasted with the static “Thought” (sixiang) officially used to canonize Maoism. By late 1967, the line of political and ideological demarcation had become clearly visible. In resisting mass demobilization and political recentralization, some Shengwulian activists sailed into ideologically perilous waters. One of their main concerns was how a more vibrant and open socialism from below might prevail over hierarchy and state-imposed regimentation. What would a society without bureaucratic domination be like? How should Chinese society be managed after the abrupt breakdown of the statist order? Yang and his comrades used the achievement of a genuine popular democracy as the criterion for assessing the Cultural Revolution. From the ivory tower of contemporary academia, their ideas might appear to be fragmentary and unsophisticated. For example, although these critics were ardently critical of both bureaucratic-socialist and capitalist regimes, they developed no alternative economic ideas, nor did they form any idea of a comprehensive social program. They came to demand equality and redistribution of power and property but rarely thought— let alone carefully— about specific institutional arrangements of political participation and governance. [souligné par nous-TML] And they impetuously called for armed struggle when violent factional clashes were bringing the country to the brink of civil war. Their views were generally improvised during the most tumultuous months of the Cultural Revolution and had little time to systematize or mature. In particular, their radical antibureaucratic critique was seriously contradicted by their own attempt to uphold Mao as the supreme revolutionary leader. And although they contested the idea of rebuilding the party-state, they nevertheless advocated the establishment of a new party of Mao Zedong–ism “in order to realize Comrade Mao Zedong’s leadership in the Party . . . and to fulfi ll the task of the Cultural Revolution.” This stance is without doubt self-contradictory. But taken as a whole, these viewpoints with all their fragmentedness and contradictions powerfully expressed the inherent limits of late Maoism as it was being pushed practically to the point of explosion.
The Universality of the Singular
The ideas of Yang Xiguang and his peers marked the emergence of an alternative interpretation of the Cultural Revolution. They contributed to the construction of a language of critique through which individual or particular struggles could be widened and connected to one another, and to the development of a new political analysis of China’s state-socialist order, in which class power directly took the form of state power. Subversive ideas such as the “bureaucratic capitalist class” served the crucial articulating function of establishing a relation among diverse grievances and demands such that their meanings were modified as the result of the articulatory practice. In the motion and exchange between the local and national, the partial and the total, general causes were joined symbolically with these particular demands and had powerful consequences for the ways local events unfolded. The important question raised by the Shengwulian episode therefore pertains to how specific grievances that demanded political expression became the general concern of a politicized public, and, more important, how local, particular, or singular issues, when absorbed into larger processes and causes, are able to inject new meaning into the latter, sometimes with profoundly transformative effects. During late 1967 and early 1968, a significant political cleavage was tentatively in the making, and an alternative ideological logic emerged. The combination of locally based demands and the development of novel political ideas that informed and gave new meanings to specific incidents and grievances had a potentially explosive impact on the mass politics of the Cultural Revolution.
But such ruptural moments did not materialize. Condemned as anarchist and antiparty, these critical currents were swiftly crushed by national and local authorities. The political and theoretical activities of the activists were suppressed ruthlessly. They were denounced for calling for the discarding of party leadership and deliberately propa-gating a false image of a self-perpetuating bureaucratic class. With the reassertion of bureaucratic centralization and interpretive control, critical voices emergent in the movement were silenced, and political orthodoxy was reimposed.The sword of Damocles fell on the Shengwulian only a few weeks after “Whither China?” was completed. Hua Guofeng, a provincial party boss who would later become Mao’s successor, concluded after reading the essay that the Shengwulian was not only “counterrevolutionary in action” but also “reactionary in thought.” At a conference in Beijing on January 24, 1968, top leaders, such as Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, Yao Wenyuan, Chen Boda, and Zhou Enlai, unanimously accused the Shengwulian of every heinous political crime imaginable. “Whither China?,” in the words of Kang Sheng, “is opposed to our great, glorious, and correct party and opposed to our peerless Chairman Mao, who has creatively developed Marxism-Leninism. . . . Not only is this opposed to the Cultural Revolution; it also repudiates the entire revolution that has been going on for de cades in China.”
Suggesting that the Hunanese critics had been influenced by Trotskyism, Kang refused to believe that ideas like these could have been produced by some middle-school students: “This theory absolutely could not have been written by a middle-school student, or even by a university student. There must be counterrevolutionary black hands manipulating them from behind.” The following exchange between the senior party leaders and the audience is worth quoting at length because it fully discloses the mind-set of those leaders, who had never failed to profess their faith in popular initiatives:
(Kang Sheng)(*) « I have noticed that Lenin is quoted: “A quotation from Lenin is very applicable to our state organs: ‘Our machinery of state . . . is very largely a survival of the past and has least of all undergone serious changes. It has only been slightly touched upon the surface, but in all other respects it is a most typical relic of the old state machine.’ ”I say that this is not the writing of a middle- school student or even a univer-sity student. I can prove it. Do any of you comrades present know what article by Lenin this statement is in, and when it was written?
(Premier Zhou: “Can anybody answer?”)
(Premier Zhou: “Middle- school students cannot answer. Can cadres in gov-ernment departments answer?”)
(Kang Sheng) This passage was originally in Lenin’s proposal at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923. . . . Lenin wrote this article with absolutely nothing of the meaning of Mr. Theoretician of the Shengwulian. What Lenin was talk-ing about was the judicial organs of the Soviet Union, which, at the time, were not effectively suppressing the counterrevolutionaries. . . . The Shengwulian distorted and vilified Lenin’s words, and by using Lenin’s words this way, went against the proletarian dictatorship. They truly deserve ten thousand deaths for this crime!(Long and enthusiastic applauses from the audience)
(Kang Sheng) If any of you still have doubts, please consult Volume 33 of Lenin’s Complete Works. Then you’ll be able to understand how vicious the tricks of these counterrevolutionaries are! They take advantage of the ignorance of middle-school students and young people about Marxism-Leninism in order to oppose our proletarian dictatorship. Comrades, even you didn’t recognize this piece, you didn’t know this article of Lenin’s. Therefore, I say to you that this document could not possibly have been written by a middle-school student, or even by a university student. »
In particular, Kang Sheng attacked the idea that a “newborn capitalist privileged stratum” had emerged in China and that the goal of the Cultural Revolution was to “smash the old state apparatus” and topple the new ruling elite, condemning it as “insane,” “shameless,” and “thoroughly reactionary.” Chen Boda, head of the CCRG, portrayed the Shengwulian as “a hodgepodge of social dregs left from the Old Society” and urged that the organization be immediately disbanded.
Although there is no indication that Mao personally authorized the suppression of the Shengwulian, he clearly was well aware of the developments in his home province and the threat they posed. At the historic meeting with Red Guard leaders in Beijing six months later, which effectively marked the end of the Red Guard movement (see Chapter 6), Mao made a disparaging reference to the “Shengwulian- style hodgepodge.” And during his visit to Hunan in June 1969, Mao again made reference to the “ultraleftist current of the Shengwulian,” noting that it “attempted in vain to reconstruct the party and the army.” On January 26, 1968, over 100,000 people attended a mass rally in Changsha. General Li Yuan, head of the Preparatory Revolutionary Committee, declared that the Shengwulian was a “hodgepodge of social dregs” consisting of “landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, rightists, unrepentant capitalist roaders, KMT remnants, and Trotskyist bandits” and ordered that the group’s views and activities be “resolutely and thor-oughly discredited and purged.” At the rally, several groups affiliated with the Shengwulian repented for having allowed themselves to be hood-winked and solemnly vowed to join the battle against the black hands.
The provincial authorities mounted a drive to denounce the Shengwulian, and numerous rallies were staged to condemn the group for “negating the great, glorious, and correct Chinese Communist Party, the great socialist country, and the great People’s Liberation Army.” Documents produced by Shengwulian activists were duplicated and distributed to government offices, factories, and schools to be scrutinized at mandatory study sessions that ironically made it possible for “poisonous weeds” such as “Whither China?” to circulate widely and gain influence not only in the province but also across the country. When the bad news reached Hunan, Yang Xiguang went into hiding. After staying for a month in Changsha with Shengwulian supporters, he fled north and was captured in Wuhan by police agents and PLA soldiers, and remained in prison until the close of the Mao era.
Searches of the building once occupied by Yang’s group reportedly discovered “black materials used in bombarding the proletarian headquarters, as well as confidential party and state documents they had stolen, rifles and pistols, over 10,000 rounds of ammunition, cases of hand grenades, a large quantity of radio communication equipment, a metal case full of gold, silver, and jew-elry, and other military equipment.” In the meantime, a witch hunt was under way to uncover the hidden class enemies behind the Shengwulian. Yang’s parents fell under immediate suspicion. His mother was interrogated and denounced at numerous public meetings, and was forced to confess that she was indeed the black hand behind her son’s activities. Tormented and under extreme duress, she committed suicide.
By late February, the Shengwulian had been largely destroyed, and most of its leaders had been arrested. The suppression paved the way for the restoration of order in Hunan. On February 21, 1968, both the Workers’ Alliance and the Xiang River, together with ten other major mass organizations, announced their dissolution, “with all members returning to their original work units to participate in the great alliance.” This, as a post-Mao party history put it, showed that “the assorted ‘rebel’ organizations that had been active on Hunan’s political stage for the past year and half would dissolve and fade out.” Six weeks later, on April 8, the Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Committee officially came into being, thereby symbolizing the achievement of political unity and order in the province.
The Shengwulian case mediated and articulated a number of grievances and discontents that erupted during the Cultural Revolution, both locally and nationally. In Hunan, however, rebel militancy that resulted from the fracturing of mass politics may not be directly explained by the social divisions established in Chinese society before 1966, as some scholars have previously argued, according to whom the activists’ political orientations and actions were shaped by their positions in the pre–Cultural Revolution status quo. Rather, the emergent positions, identities, and politics of the recalcitrant rebels were the products of contingent, open-ended political processes that brought a variety of aspirations and demands into play. What is crucial is not merely the specificity and plurality of the struggles but also, more important, the overdetermined relations that diverse struggles established among themselves, as well as the unforeseeable generalizing effects that might follow.
Many of the conflicts in the Cultural Revolution were local or particular and involved specific groups making differential demands apparently unrelated to the others. However, a new discursive horizon opened up when singular events made implicit (or even explicit) references to broader social conditions and political issues and came to be associated with the development of a powerful critique of the existing structure of power. Through the critics’ creative reinterpretations of Maoist doctrine, local events and antagonisms were emptied of their contextual specificities and became emblems of new, wider struggles. Aggregated into conflicts only indirectly or even remotely connected to the originally dispersed incidents and grievances, individual struggles cumulatively became simplified and more abstract and ended as tokens in a remapped political space polarized into the people and the new ruling class.
As Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe argued, no political movements can ever remain confined within themselves. Through constant motion among diverse struggles, they are often transformed into examples and symbols of a broader resistance, “thus fueling and giving birth to other movements.” Mao and other national leaders well understood the political dangers that might result from the unforeseen convergence of an increasingly unruly mass movement, widespread social antagonisms, and catalyzing heterodox ideas. By swiftly suppressing the Shengwulian, they expediently averted a potentially explosive political situation.
(* retrouvé sur le net, le texte intégral du discours social-fasciste de Kang Cheng, encore actuellement relayé par les maoïstes français et une partie du PCF: KANG CHENG CONDAMNE SHENGWULIAN – 24-01-1968 )
De la Chine de Mao à la Chine actuelle
…les mutations du capitalisme chinois :
Suite au débat du CUEM-Sorbonne, avec M. Herrera, auteur d’un livre tentant d’accréditer la thèse du « socialisme à la chinoise », le débat s’est donc prolongé sur TML, avec une intervention de M. Drweski, qui a tourné un peu court, puis par un échange avec le camarade Viriato, échange qui semblait devoir buter sur les mêmes écueils, après un début très polémique, mais qui a finalement porté ses fruits en matière d’éclaircissements sur le sujet. Nous l’avons donc retranscrit en republiant à la suite de l’article les posts et les mails dont il est constitué, ainsi que les extraits en PDF des pages citées du livre, et d’autres graphiques évoqués dans les mails.
Rappelons qu’un précédent et récent débat avait eu lieu sur le sujet de l’économie chinoise, avec M. Roland Diagne, dont un correspondant nous a également communiqué un texte de 2017, mais toujours d’actu concernant ce débat.
POUR ALLER PLUS LOIN, UNE ETUDE DE FOND SUR L’EVOLUTION DU CAPITALISME CHINOIS DEPUIS MAO :
Chine-USA, 2014-2019 : Chronique d’une guerre économique annoncée…